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Abstract 
For many years prior to its demise, Lehman Brothers employed Ernst & Young (EY) as the 
firm’s independent auditors to review its financial statements and express an opinion as to 
whether they fairly represented the company’s financial position. EY was supposed to try to 
detect fraud, determine whether a matter should be publicly disclosed, and communicate 
certain issues to Lehman’s Board audit committee. After Lehman filed for bankruptcy, it was 
discovered that the firm had employed questionable accounting with regard to an 
unorthodox financing transaction, Repo 105, which it used to make its results appear better 
than they were. EY was aware of Lehman’s use of Repo 105, and its failure to disclose its use. 
EY also knew that Lehman included in its liquidity pool assets that were impaired. When 
questioned, EY insisted that it had done nothing wrong. However, Anton R. Valukas, the 
Lehman bankruptcy examiner, concluded that EY had not fulfilled its duties and that 
probable claims existed against EY for malpractice. In this case, participants will consider 
the role and effectiveness of independent auditors in ensuring complete and accurate 
financial statements and related public disclosure. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is one of eight Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) case modules considering the 
Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy:  
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy A: Overview. 
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy B: Risk Limits and Stress Tests  
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy C: Managing the Balance Sheet Through the Use of Repo 105 
•  The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy D: The Role of Ernst & Young 
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E: The Effects on Lehman’s U.S. Broker-Dealer  
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy F: Introduction to the ISDA Master Agreement  
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy G: The Special Case of Derivatives  
• The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy H: The Global Contagion  
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises.  
2 Director, The Global Financial Crisis Project and Senior Editor, YPFS, Yale School of Management  
3 Chief, Banking Research Section, Division of Insurance and Research, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. The analysis, conclusions, and opinions set forth here are those of the author alone and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
4 Janet L. Yellen Professor of Finance and Management at the Yale School of Management, and YPFS Program 
Director, Yale School of Management 
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1.   Introduction  
Ernst & Young Global Limited (EY) served as Lehman Brothers’ independent auditors from 
2001until Lehman filed for bankruptcy in 2008. During this period, it reviewed and signed- 
off on Lehman’s financial statements, in each case giving the preferred unqualified opinion. 
Anton Valukas, the Lehman bankruptcy examiner, raised serious questions about some of 
Lehman’s accounting methods and the role that EY played in allowing certain items to go 
unchallenged and undisclosed in its financial statements, particularly its use of, and 
accounting for, Repo 105 repurchase agreements, which enabled Lehman to shift up to $50 
billion from its balance sheet at quarter-end and report more favorable results. Valukas 
concluded that Lehman’s statements were misleading and that plausible claims existed 
against EY for negligence and malpractice.  
EY contended that it had done no wrong. It stood by its opinion that Lehman’s financial 
statements had been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) and that Lehman’s bankruptcy “was not caused by any accounting issues.” Valukas 
and others, however, argued that determining whether the financial statements technically 
complied with GAAP was neither the proper standard nor the full extent of EY’s duty.  
The Lehman bankruptcy case also engendered debate regarding the historic role of the 
independent auditor as one of the few checks on management and whether such firms still 
have duties to the general investing public.  
This case will (1) enable participants to become familiar with the role of the independent 
auditor in the United States (US), (2) provide participants with an understanding of the 
regulatory scheme applicable to independent auditors of public companies, and (3) examine 
and evaluate EY’s actions as Lehman’s auditor in the years leading to its demise. 
The balance of this case is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the historic role of the 
independent auditor, and Section 3 focuses on the auditor’s role as public guardian. Section 
4 discusses the self-regulatory scheme that evolved to set standards for the profession. 
Section 5 discusses the advent of government regulation in 2002. Section 6 provides 
information about EY, while sections 7 through 9 analyze different aspects of EY's role as 
Lehman’s auditor with respect to Repo 105. Section 10 concludes with a summary of events 
occurring after the bankruptcy. 
Questions 
1. Did EY fulfill its obligations to Lehman and the public? 
2. Had developments in the profession and the economy nullified the auditor’s duty to 
the public by 2008?  
3. Are auditing firms so beholden to their clients that it is unreasonable to also expect 
them to be watchdogs for the public interest?  
4. Is the regulatory scheme inherently flawed in still requiring auditors to perform this 
oversight role?  
5. Should the regulatory scheme be strengthened so as to compel auditors to be more 
deliberate in their oversight role?  
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6. Is it realistic to expect the auditor to take positions against its client’s interests no 
matter what the regulatory scheme?  
2.   The Historic Role of the Independent Auditor  
In the U.S., the role of the independent auditor evolved due to the need to have an 
independent check on financial information offered by companies. Since management 
prepares the financials that reflect their performance in running the company, they have an 
incentive to present the results in as positive a light as possible. Yet, investors need to have 
data that is transparent, accurate and comparable in order for markets to operate in a 
reasonable and orderly manner. Having an independent firm audit the company’s financial 
statements provides a check on management. The evolution of accounting and auditing 
standards made this process even more useful, since investors could then compare financial 
information across companies. 
Public accounting grew into a mature profession in the wake of the passage of the first 
federal income tax in 1913. The subgenre of independent auditing largely came of age with 
two systemic changes adopted in the wake of the Great Depression. First, in 1933, the New 
York Stock Exchange began requiring any company applying for a listing to present an audit 
certificate for its financial statements, certifying that an audit had been performed by an 
independent certified public accountant (Wootton and Wolk 1992, 10). 
The second defining development was the securities regulatory regime established by the 
passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These new 
laws gave the newly established Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) the mission of 
ensuring that investors receive full and fair disclosure about securities sold on US exchanges. 
The new laws required that each company seeking to sell securities had to provide potential 
investors with a prospectus setting forth specified information about the company’s 
business and finances. Directors and officers could be held liable for any material 
misstatement or omission in the prospectus, leading them to have the financial statements 
audited and certified.  
The new laws also mandated that all reports filed with the SEC had to include audited 
financial statements certified by an independent public accountant. These new laws served 
to increase the prestige for the public accounting profession, and enlarged their 
responsibility to shareholders and to the general public alike. Not only did accountants have 
a social responsibility to the public, but they now had a potential legal liability to that public 
as well (Ibid., 11). Decades later US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson would state in 
describing the profession’s role: “Our accounting system is the lifeblood of our capital 
markets” (Advisory Committee Report, C: 8). 
A January 2008 study by the US Government Accounting Office (GAO) also succinctly 
captures the profession’s critical role: 
Having auditors attest to the reliability of financial statements of public companies is 
intended to increase public and investor confidence in the fairness of the financial 
information. Moreover, investors and other users of financial statements expect 
auditors to bring integrity, independence, objectivity, and professional competence 
to the financial reporting process and to prevent the issuance of misleading financial 
statements. The resulting sense of confidence in companies’ audited financial 
statements, which is key to the efficient functioning of the markets for public 
companies’ securities, can exist only if reasonable investors perceive auditors as 
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independent and expert professionals who will conduct thorough audits” (GAO 
Report, 7). 
Expansion of Services 
As the complexity and sophistication of businesses and the economy grew to be more global, 
the accounting firms expanded accordingly. Companies and investors also relied on 
accounting firms to validate new products and transactions. Beginning in the 1960s and 
expanding significantly in the 1980s, the provision of non-audit services by accounting firms 
soon became a large and profitable part of a firm’s relationship with its clients, often bringing 
in as much in fees as the audit services did. A firm might provide a client with tax, due 
diligence, or consulting services, all of which the firm would then audit—in essence signing 
off on the work of its colleagues. This dual role presented potential conflicts of interest and 
was implicated in the Enron and other corporate scandals of the late twentieth century. (See 
Wootton and Wolk 1992 for more history about the role of the public accountant.) 
Industry Concentration and Systemic Risk 
As client businesses grew and spread globally, so did the accounting firms. Public accounting 
became highly concentrated, largely through several waves of mergers. By early in the 
twentieth century the profession had become dominated by the “Big Eight” firms, which 
provided most services to the country’s larger corporations. By 2008, the Big Eight had 
shrunk to the “Big Four,”—Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, PwC, Ernst & Young (EY), and 
KPMG—as identified in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: The “Big Four” Accounting Firms 
Firm Revenues Employees Revenue per Employee 
Fiscal 
Year Headquarters 
Deloitte $32.4bn 200,000 $162,000 2013 United States 
PwC $32.1bn 184,000 $174,456 2013 United Kingdom 
Ernst & Young $25.8bn 175,000 $147,428 2013 United Kingdom 
KPMG $23.4bn 155,000 $150,968 2013 Netherlands 
Source: Wikipedia: Big Four (audit firms), AICPA 2002. 
 
Since 2003, companies wishing to perform audits for publicly traded companies have been 
required to register with the Pubic Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). (See 
Government Regulation: The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 below). At the end of 2012, there 
were 2,363 companies registered, an increase from the 1,874 firms registered at the end of 
2008. The GAO Report, however, found that the Big Four firms audited 98% of the 1,500 
largest public companies—those with annual revenues of more than $1 billion—and 92% of 
public companies with revenues between $500 million and $1 billion (GAO Report, 4). The 
study also found that in 2006, these four firms received 94.4% of all audit fees paid by public 
companies (Ibid., 16). 
In its October 2008 Report, the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (Advisory 
Committee Report) issued by US Treasury Secretary Paulson, characterized this 
concentration as a systemic risk to the financial system, one that would increase if one of the 
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firms were to fail or leave the market (as Arthur Andersen did), leading to even greater 
concentration. Risks resulting from this concentration included the ability to manipulate 
fees—or otherwise adversely act as an oligopoly—the inability to hire sufficient qualified 
personnel to timely meet market needs for audits, and the risk that the quality of audits 
would be negatively impacted (Advisory Committee Report, VIII: 3). These risks are 
exacerbated by the GAO finding that a majority of medium and small firms reported no 
interest in pursuing the audit business of the largest corporations (GAO Report, 5). 
Neither the GAO Report nor the Advisory Committee Report included recommendations for 
how to lessen the concentration in the profession. However, the Advisory Committee 
recommended greater monitoring by the PCAOB of the largest globally significant 
accounting firms and greater coordination with international standards, and also 
recommended that the auditor’s report disclose all cooperating audit firms that contributed 
to the report (in recognition of the decentralized structures of many firms). (For further 
information see GAO Report, 75-81, Appendix II: Other Issues Related to Concentration in 
the Audit Market; and Advisory Committee Report, pages II:1-II:10, Co-Chair’s Statement; 
VIII:1-VIII:23.) 
 
3.   Independence and Public Responsibility: The Certified Public 
Accountant as Public Guardian 
For much of the twentieth century, accounting was viewed as a stodgy, conservative 
profession; even its self-imposed rules discouraged competition. But accounting was highly 
regarded, and the new laws enacted after the Depression helped to solidify the auditor’s role 
and bolster the profession’s credibility as an objective reviewer of management’s financial 
statements on which the public could rely.  
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Code of Professional Conduct 
(AICPA Code) makes it clear that public responsibility continues to be a key hallmark of the 
profession and, in fact, is intricately linked to the concepts of independence and due 
professional care: 
The public interest aspect of certified public accountants' services requires that such 
services be consistent with acceptable professional behavior for certified public 
accountants. Integrity requires that service and the public trust not be subordinated 
to personal gain and advantage. Objectivity and independence require that members 
be free from conflicts of interest in discharging professional responsibilities. Due care 
requires that services be provided with competence and diligence (AICPA Code §50). 
Client Loyalty vs. Public Duty 
However, developments in the profession would come to challenge this important principle. 
Often a company retained an audit firm for a long period of time. For example, EY was 
Lehman’s auditor from 2001 to 2008, and also provided numerous other services. Such 
longevity was thought to increase the efficiency of the auditor’s work since it became more 
familiar with the company and its management. However, the increasing concentration of 
the accounting profession, the increased breadth of services they offered, and this tendency 
for firms to engage an accountant for years, leads to concerns that the accountant’s 
independence and objectivity might be compromised. 
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The risks to an accountant’s independence became more apparent at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century when a number of auditing firms were implicated in a wave of major 
corporate scandals, for example, Enron (Arthur Andersen, 2001), Tyco 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002), WorldCom (Arthur Andersen, 2002), and HealthSouth 
(Ernst & Young, 2003). Notably, of the firms implicated, Arthur Andersen did not survive. 
There has recently been discussion in the profession regarding whether the CPA continues 
to have “public responsibility,” or whether a CPA owes loyalty solely to the client. A recent 
PCAOB Staff Alert calls for more attention to these matters, urging auditors to apply more 
skepticism and to remember that their first loyalty is to investors: 
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial 
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any 
employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant 
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s 
creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This “public watchdog” 
function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at 
all times and requires complete fidelity to the public (U.S. v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 
US 805, 817-18 (1984) cited in PACAOB Staff Practice Alert 10, 8). 
And in considering EY’s role in Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, Anton R. Valukas, the 
examiner said: 
Nevertheless, and wholly apart from the claims involving Lehman’s auditors, we must 
recognize the general principle that auditors serve a critical role in the proper 
functioning of public companies and financial markets. Boards of directors and audit 
committees are entitled to rely on external auditors to serve as watchdogs—to be 
important gatekeepers who provide an independent check on management. And the 
investing public is entitled to believe that a "clean" report from an independent 
auditor stands for something. The public has every right to conclude that auditors 
who hold themselves out as independent will stand up to management and not 
succumb to pressure to avoid rocking the boat (Valukas 2011, 2-3). 
One must, however, question how this responsibility to the public is manifested in real life, 
given the very real dilemma faced by an audit firm and its engagement partner. Often, as was 
the case with Lehman, a firm will retain the same external audit firm for several years and 
bill it millions of dollars in fees. (Lehman paid EY $150 million in fees between 2001 and 
2008.) Audit partners from external firms often develop strong relational ties to clients and 
have significant personal financial interests in maintaining the account. A large industrial 
company or bank may be the audit partner’s only client, the loss of which may be difficult, if 
not impossible, to replace with one of like size and stature in a short period of time. Thus, 
partners of external audit firms, and the firms themselves, have a strong financial incentive 
to keep clients happy. (See PCAOB Board member Jeannette M. Franzel’s comments on 
auditor independence and communications with the audit committee.)  
4.   The Self-Regulatory Regime 
Despite the regulatory changes of the 1930s, the setting of accounting standards was left to 
the profession. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which grew out of a 
committee of the AICPA and which was established as a separate entity in 1972 (and became 
operational in 1973), has responsibility for establishing rules for measuring, reporting, and 
disclosing information on financial statements of nongovernmental entities. These rules are 
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collected as generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). A separate entity of the AICPA, 
the Auditing Standards Board (ASB), creates standards by which an auditor determines 
whether information reported on a financial statement is reasonable and conforms to GAAP. 
These are collected as generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS).  
Due Professional Care  
Two important tenants of the professional standards that were implicated in the Lehman 
situation were independence, as discussed above, and due professional care, which imposes 
a responsibility on the auditor to observe the standards of fieldwork and reporting. These 
include: (1) exercising professional skepticism, (2) making efforts to detect fraud, and (3) 
determining whether a particular matter should be disclosed in light of the circumstances 
and facts which the auditor was aware of at the time. In addition, the auditor is required to 
inquire about accounting methods, unusual situations and trends, and to report certain 
things learned during the audit directly to the Board audit committee, including significant 
accounting policies, methods used to account for significant unusual transactions, and 
misstatements (even if immaterial and left uncorrected). The auditor is also required to 
comment to the audit committee on the quality of management’s accounting policies, not just 
their acceptability [AU §§ 230, 380 and 561. (PCAOB auditing standards are cited herein as 
AU, followed by a section number.)] 
The Auditor’s Report  
The intended result of the auditor’s review is the audit report providing an unqualified 
opinion certifying, according to the standard report wording, “that the financial statements 
present fairly, in all material respects, financial position, results of operations, and cash flows 
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles [GAAP].” An opinion other than 
an unqualified one can have considerable impact, as deal terms often require a party to 
deliver financials supported by an unqualified opinion. Delivering less can be considered a 
negative and can derail a transaction. (See Appendix A for AU §508, showing the standard 
audit report form as well as other options.) 
In each year from 2001 through 2008 EY reviewed and signed off on Lehman’s financial 
statements, giving an unqualified opinion that the statements had been prepared in 
accordance with GAAP. However, professional standards provide that technical compliance 
with GAAP is not sufficient to support an unqualified opinion. “Generally accepted 
accounting principles recognize the importance of reporting transactions and events in 
accordance with their substance. The auditor should consider whether the substance of 
transactions or events differs materially from their form” (AU § 411.06). 
Additionally, several courts have ruled that strict application of FASB standards does not 
ensure compliance with GAAP. GAAP’s “ultimate goals of fairness and accuracy in reporting 
require more than mere technical compliance” (In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. 
Supp.2d 319, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) cited at Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 965). The auditor must 
consider all the facts and circumstances and determine not just whether the accounting is 
correct, but also, that, when taken as a whole, the statements fairly present the results and 
are not misleading; GAAP is but one tool to be used in making this determination (Ibid.). (See 
Appendix B, EY’s reports on the financial statements included with Lehman’s 2007 Form 10-
K and PCAOB Board Member Daniel L. Goelzer’s comments on the proposed changes to the 
audit report.) 
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5.   Government Regulation: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), one of the most significant pieces of business 
legislation passed in decades, was enacted following the wave of corporate scandals that 
occurred at the beginning of the twenty-first century in which several companies’ accounting 
firms were implicated in the fraudulent use of off-balance-sheet accounting and other 
devices. SOX imposed new oversight duties on public companies with respect to their 
independent auditors and enacted rules designed to prevent accounting fraud. A number of 
its major points relevant to the Lehman situation are discussed below. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
Recognizing that the prior scheme of self-regulation had failed, SOX established a new 
independent quasi-governmental body to regulate accounting firms providing audits of 
public companies. The mission of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
is to “protect the interest of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of 
informative, accurate, and independent audit reports” for US companies whose securities are 
publicly traded. The PCAOB issues standards governing public company audits and has 
adopted several AICPA auditing standards as its interim standards. The PCAOB also conducts 
periodic inspections of registered firms and has the authority to sanction individual firms 
and auditors. And as of 2010, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the PCAOB also monitors and 
oversees auditors of registered brokers and dealers. 
Auditors Must Register with the PCAOB and Be Independent 
Since 2002, companies issuing securities subject to SEC regulation must file with the SEC 
registration statements and other periodic and annual reports that are required to include 
financial statements that have been audited by accounting firms registered with the PCAOB. 
Such financial statements must be audited in accordance with standards promulgated by the 
PCAOB. The auditors must also meet SEC and PCAOB standards for independence. 
Independence means, generally, that an auditor does not have any financial or fiduciary ties 
to the client and must not have performed any of the nine non-audit services proscribed by 
SOX.5  
Enhanced Company Requirements 
SOX requires public companies to have a Board audit committee comprised of “independent 
directors” (i.e., those not affiliated with the company as statutorily defined), including at least 
one director who is a “financial expert” (i.e., someone with financial or accounting experience 
as statutorily defined).  
Seeking to disrupt the close bond between management and the auditor, SOX mandates that 
the Board audit committee, not management, is responsible for negotiating the statement of 
work and fees with the auditor. Further, the auditor has a duty to report certain findings 
directly to the audit committee and may meet with the committee in private without 
management attending. The company must also have its system of internal controls over 
financial reporting attested to by the independent auditor. (See pages 10-15 of the GAO 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5 The nine services are: bookkeeping; financial information systems design and implementation; appraisal or 
valuation services, fairness opinions or contribution-in-kind reports; actuarial services; internal audit 
outsourcing services; management functions or human resources; broker-dealer, investment adviser, or 
investment banking services; and legal and expert services unrelated to the audit. 
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Report for a discussion of statutory and accounting standard changes enacted following SOX 
and SEC Press Release 2003-9 regarding Rules Strengthening Auditor Independence.) 
6.  The History of Ernst & Young 
Although one of its constituent entities dates back to 1849, the modern incarnation of Ernst 
and Young (EY) was incorporated in 1989 through a merger of “Big Eight” accounting firms 
Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young & Co., then the third- and sixth-largest firms, 
respectively. The merger created what was at the time the world’s largest accounting firm, 
reporting post-merger revenues (1990) of $5 billion. The firm grew steadily, and by 1998, 
its revenues had doubled to $10.9 billion. By June 2013, EY employed 175,000 persons with 
a headquarters in New York and over 700 offices in 150 countries worldwide. However, due 
to other changes in the industry, its 2013 revenues of $25.8 billion made it then only the 
world’s third-largest accounting firm behind Deloitte and PwC, according to Forbes 
magazine. 
As described on its company website, EY is a limited liability partnership and operates a 
series of managed coordinated entities in each country. It services a client base of large firms 
from varying industries, and its business consists of professional services in four broad 
categories. Its service lines and share of revenues in 2013 were: 
• Assurance Services (43%): comprises Financial Audit (core assurance), Financial 
Accounting Advisory Services, Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services, and Climate 
Change & Sustainability Services. 
• Tax Services (27%): includes Transfer Pricing, International Tax Services, Business 
Tax Compliance, Human Capital, Customs, Indirect Tax, Tax Accounting & Risk 
Advisory Services, Transaction, and Tax. 
• Advisory Services (22%): consisting of four subservice lines: Actuarial, IT Risk and 
Assurance, Risk, and Performance Improvement. 
• Transaction Advisory Services (TAS) (8%): deals with companies' capital agenda—
preserving, optimizing, investing, and raising capital (EY Global Review).  
(For more information see the EY website at http://www.ey.com for company data. For a 
detailed history of EY see International Directories of Company Histories 2000.)  
7.   Ernst & Young as Lehman’s Independent Auditor 
Lehman employed EY as the firm’s independent auditors from 2001 to 2008. In reviewing 
Lehman’s financial statements, EY had a duty to comply with all professional standards, 
including to perform tests, gather corroborating evidence to support the financial 
statements, obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements were free 
of material misstatements, and provide an opinion regarding whether the financial 
statements were fairly presented in conformity with GAAP (AU §311). As discussed below, 
however, EY’s role, as is common in practice, went beyond merely reviewing Lehman’s 
financial statements. It was a trusted advisor, relied on and consulted with respect to 
numerous financial and accounting matters regarding Lehman’s vast and sophisticated 
business. (See Wiggins, et al 2014A for overview of Lehman Brother’s operations.)  
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Lehman’s Repo 105 Policy 
Like most investment banks, Lehman regularly used sale and repurchase agreements 
(repos) to meet its daily short-term borrowing needs, borrowing funds on a short-term basis 
against assets that it delivered as collateral. A few days later, it would repay the borrowed 
funds and repurchase the assets. Lehman accounted for standard repurchase agreements as 
“financings.” It retained the assets on its balance sheet, accounted for the cash as an increase 
in borrowings, and booked the obligation to repay the loan (and repurchase the collateral) 
as an offsetting liability; total assets remained unchanged. As discussed below, the 
significance of treating repos as “sales” instead of “financings” lies in the differing accounting 
treatment.  
In September 2000, shortly after Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 140 (SFAS 
140), permitting certain repos to be treated as “sales” rather than “financings” for accounting 
purposes, took effect, Lehman developed a policy and program explaining how the firm 
might benefit from the standard. Repo 105, a repo over-collateralized by 5%, was the result. 
Under its interpretation of SFAS 140, Lehman accounted for Repo 105s as “sales,” rather than 
“financings.”  
This interpretation permitted Lehman to remove from its balance sheet the securities 
transferred as collateral, reducing assets. The cash received was not booked as borrowings, 
and the obligation to repay/repurchase was not booked as an increase in liabilities. Instead, 
the right to repurchase the collateral was booked as a derivative right to purchase securities 
in the future. Thus, use of Repo 105 transactions enabled Lehman to temporarily remove 
assets from, and reduce, its balance sheet. Lehman was also able to reduce its non-related 
debt through use of the cash received, thereby further reducing its net leverage ratio. (For 
additional analysis and discussion of Lehman’s use of Repo 105, see Wiggins, et al. 2014C.) 
Because Lehman could not find a US law firm to issue a “true sale” opinion to support its 
Repo 105 interpretation, it relied on a letter from a UK law firm, Linklaters, for all of its Repo 
105 transactions, which it executed by transferring billions of dollars from its US operations 
to a UK subsidiary (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 765-93). 
There is some dispute over just what role EY played in the development of Lehman’s Repo 
105 policy. EY claims to have had no advisory role in development of the policy. However, 
several Lehman employees remember discussing the policy with their outside accountants. 
Nevertheless, at some point, EY became aware of Lehman’s Repo 105 policy and had 
numerous discussions with Lehman personnel regarding the practice (Ibid., Vol. 3, 948-51). 
When asked if the Lehman policy was an accurate interpretation of SFAS 140, William 
Schlich, the EY engagement partner, replied that EY had never evaluated the policy to see if 
it was a sound interpretation of SFAS 140. Schlich stated that EY did not “approve” of 
Lehman’s Repo 105 accounting policy but that the firm “[became] comfortable with the 
policy for purposes of auditing the financial statements” and “did not pass upon the actual 
practice” (Ibid., 948-49). Schlich also insisted that while EY’s audit responsibilities required 
it to inquire whether Repo 105s were accounted for correctly, EY was not required to review 
the timing or volume of such transactions (Ibid.). 
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Lehman’s Use of Repo 105 in 2007 and 2008 
From 2001 through 2006, Lehman regularly engaged in standard repo and Repo 105 
transactions in varying volumes. (There was also limited use of a Repo 108 transaction.)6 By 
mid-2007, real estate markets were beginning to show signs of weakening. As Lehman and 
other investment banks came under greater scrutiny regarding the value of their real-estate-
related assets and liquidity, rating agencies and analysts pressured the banks to reduce their 
leverage. 
Due to its inability to sell its substantial position in mortgage-backed securities at or near its 
book value, Lehman turned to Repo 105, even though by then most of its peers had ceased 
to use it. As shown in Figure 2, during 2007 and 2008 Lehman significantly escalated its use 
of Repo 105s to as high as $50 billion in the second quarter of 2008, which enabled it to 
temporarily remove corresponding amounts of assets form its balance sheet.  
Figure 2: Monthly Repo 105 Usage (in $billions) 
 
Note: The amounts shown above correspond to the combined totals of Lehman’s Repo 105 and Repo 108 
transactions for the period. 
Source: Derived from Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 875. 
 
The bankruptcy examiner concluded that Lehman’s high volume of Repo 105s enabled it to 
report a more favorable balance sheet and material reductions in its net leverage ratio, as 
shown in Figure 3. Had its extensive use of Repo 105s, its related “sale” accounting treatment, 
and the impact on its leverage ratio been disclosed, Lehman would likely have experienced 
an immediate and significant negative impact to its credit rating and market confidence. (See 
Wiggins, et al. 2014C for more about how Repo 105 impacted Lehman.) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6 Repo 108 transactions were similar to Repo 105s but utilized equity rather than debt securities as collateral 
and an 8% haircut. Lehman also treated Repo 108s as sales. Their volume rose as high as 37% of Repo 105 
amounts during 2007-Q2, however, Repo 108 usage in Q1- and Q2-2008 represented no more than 13% and 
16%, respectively, of Repo 105 amounts.  
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In auditing Lehman’s financial reports for fiscal year-end 2007, EY reviewed numerous 
documents and held many meetings with Lehman personnel. EY also analyzed the various 
balance sheet netting mechanisms used by Lehman, including Repo 105, and reviewed the 
Repo 105 accounting policy, the related accounting treatment, and the transactions. 
EY did not, however, request additional information from Lehman regarding how it reached 
its conclusions regarding the accounting treatment of Repo 105s under SFAS 140, or ask to 
see the Linklaters opinion letter, of which it was aware.7 It also did not request an 
explanation from Lehman regarding the amounts or pattern of Repo 105 escalation. And 
despite its duty to apply “professional skepticism” and to “inquire about unusual situations 
and transactions,” EY never questioned Lehman’s Repo 105 usage, notwithstanding the fact 
that it was an unusually expensive way to raise funds and that it was well-known in the 
industry that Lehman’s peer investment banks had ceased to utilize the mechanism. (See 
Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 1028-53 analyzing EY’s performance and the EY letter to clients 
addressing the same.) 
8.   The Whistleblower Letter and Audit Committee Communication  
As Senior Vice President, Global Balance Sheet of Lehman, Matthew Lee’s responsibilities 
included consolidating the financial and accounting information provided by Lehman’s 
subsidiaries from around the world into the one consolidated financial statement used by 
the firm as the basis for its public reporting. On May 16, 2008, Lee sent a letter to several 
senior Lehman officers alleging accounting errors and other irregularities (the 
“Whistleblower Letter”)8. Lehman’s management provided the letter to its Board audit 
committee, which asked to be informed of all of Lee’s allegations, and to EY, which was 
directed to conduct an investigation into the allegations.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
7 This may have been because the US Ernst & Young firm considered the Repo 105 transactions, which were 
executed in the UK using funds transferred from the US, to be subject to the UK audit, not the US audit that it 
was conducting. Lehman’s UK subsidiary was audited by Ernst & Young’s UK affiliate. However, it must be 
remembered, as Schlich acknowledged, that Lehman’s financials all rolled up into the US statements. (See 
Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 950, FN 3665.) 
8 “I have become aware of certain conduct and practices, however, that I feel compelled to bring to your 
attention, as required by the Firm’s Code of Ethics, as Amended February 17, 2004 (the “Code”), and which 
requires me, as a Firm employee, to bring to the attention of management conduct and actions on the part of 
the Firm that I consider to possibly constitute unethical or unlawful conduct.” (Lee, 2008). 
 
Figure 3: Lehman’s Reported Net Leverage vs. Net Leverage Without Repo 105 






Q4 2007 $38.6 B 16.1 17.8 1.7 
Q1 2008 $49.1 B 15.4 17.3 1.9 
Q2 2008 $50.4 B 12.1 13.9 1.8 
Source: Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 748. 
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William Schlich, the EY engagement partner, interviewed Matthew Lee on June 12, 2008, at 
which meeting Lee also told EY about Lehman’s escalating use of Repo 105 and its impact on 
the firm’s balance sheet. On June 13, 2008, Lehman management and Schlich met with the 
Lehman Board audit committee to discuss the company’s second-quarter financial reports. 
On July 2, 2008, Schlich again met with the audit committee to review the final statements. 
On July 10, EY issued an unqualified report regarding the second quarter Form 10-Q, despite 
the Whistleblower Letter. On July 22, 2008, Schlich attend a full board meeting at which a 
Lehman officer delivered a presentation regarding the Whistleblower Letter; the 
presentation did not mention use of Repo 105. Notwithstanding its statutory obligations 
under SOX and the audit committee’s request to be informed of all allegations made by Lee, 
EY did not inform the audit committee or the full board of Lee’s allegations regarding Repo 
105 at any of these meetings. Anton Valukas concluded that such failure amounted to 
negligence and malpractice. (See the Lee Whistleblower Letter.) 
9.   Lehman’s Disclosure 
From 2000 through 2008, Lehman prepared its Forms 10-K and 10-Q reports in accordance 
with GAAP and affirmatively stated therein that it sometimes used repos as a means of short-
term borrowings and that it accounted for them as “financings.” At no time did Lehman 
mention in any of its Form 10-Ks or 10-Qs, directly or indirectly, its use of Repo 105s or that 
it accounted for any of its repo transactions as “sales,” pursuant to SFAS 140. Specifically, 
“[a]n investor reviewing Lehman’s 2007 Form 10-K and two 2008 Forms 10-Q would not 
have been able to discern that Lehman was engaged in Repo 105 transactions” (Examiner’s 
Report, Vol. 3, 973). In fact, there were no disclosures from which an investor could have 
inferred such. This lack of disclosure contributed to a misunderstanding on the part of 
investors that Lehman was reducing its balance sheet through sales of assets. (See Wiggins, 
et al. 2014C for more discussion of Lehman’s disclosure.) 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Results of Operations and Financial Condition 
Pursuant to SEC regulations, Lehman was required to discuss known trends and 
uncertainties related to its cash flow, capital resources, and results of operations, as well as 
unusual and infrequent events and transactions that could have a material favorable or 
unfavorable impact on the company in its Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Results 
of Operations and Financial Condition (MD&A), included in its periodic reports filed with the 
SEC (AT §701). 
Because Lehman accounted for its Repo 105 transactions as sales rather than borrowings 
(as it treated other repo transactions), Lehman did not disclose its liabilities arising from the 
obligation to repay the Repo 105 borrowings. Thus, Lehman was able to borrow tens of 
billions in cash and use that money to pay off liabilities unrelated to the repos without 
disclosing that a few days after the close of the quarter it would have to raise tens of billions 
more to buy back the assets given as collateral (Examiner’s Report, Vol. 3, 974). For these 
reasons, the examiner found that Lehman’s MD&A statements about its liquidity and 
liabilities (i.e., its obligation to repurchase the securities) were deficient and misleading 
(Ibid., 1027). 
Although the MD&A is not covered by the auditor's report, the auditor is required to read the 
MD&A and to be satisfied that it is clear and complete. It is also obligated to comment on not 
just the technical correctness of the company’s accounting but also on the quality of that 
accounting. According to interviews with Lehman and EY personnel, EY did not question the 
sufficiency of Lehman’s liquidity and liability disclosures in its MD&A, although it knew that 
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billions of dollars relating to the Repo 105 obligations were not discussed. It also did not 
suggest to Lehman that its prior statements might be misleading or might require correction 
(Examiner’s Report, 965). 
Several commentators have concluded that even if Lehman’s accounting treatment of Repo 
105s was consistent with SFAS 140 and GAAP, EY still had a duty to inquire whether the 
financial statements were materially misleading. The bankruptcy examiner concluded that 
EY had failed to adequately perform that duty and thus found that possible claims existed 
against EY for professional negligence with respect to: (1) failing to inform the audit 
committee of Lehman’s usage of Repo 105, (2) its handling of the Whistleblower Letter and 
Lee’s complaint regarding Repo 105, and (3) not challenging Lehman’s filing of financial 
reports that were materially misleading (Ibid., 1027). 
10.  Postscript 
Notwithstanding the bankruptcy examiner’s findings, since the release of the examiner’s 
report, in March 2010, the SEC has declined to initiate any proceeding against EY. A May 
2012 report indicated that “[t]he staff [of the SEC] has concluded its investigation and 
determined that charges will likely not be recommended” (Gallu 2012). While it has not 
publicly closed the case, as of December 2013, the SEC had not commenced any such action. 
The PCAOB has also not sanctioned EY.  
Shortly after publication of the examiner’s report, in March 2010, EY sent a letter to its clients 
in which it disputed the examiner’s analysis and conclusions—“Our opinion stated that 
Lehman’s financial statements for 2007 were fairly presented in accordance with US GAAP, 
and we remain of that view.” It further stated with respect to its handling of the 
Whistleblower Letter that it had not completed its investigation, which had in effect been cut 
short by Lehman’s filing for bankruptcy protection. 
As reported in The Guardian on June 22, 2012, the UK Accountancy and Actuarial Discipline 
Board (AADB) decided not to take any disciplinary action against EY or any individuals in 
connection with its role in auditing the European banking arm of Lehman Brothers, a 
decision that came after an 18-month investigation.  
On January 28, 2013, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., the bankrupt holding company, filed 
an arbitration action against EY, asserting accounting malpractice and breach of contract 
arising out of EY’s annual audits and quarterly reviews of Lehman’s financial statements 
from 2001 to 2008. Lehman sought disgorgement of fees paid to EY and costs it had incurred 
in entering into Repo 105 transactions. On April 7, 2014, the arbitration panel rendered a 
final award with prejudice in EY’s favor and against Lehman stating that “any wrongdoing 
associated with Repo 105s is overwhelmingly attributable to Lehman” (EY vs. LBHI, 4). As of 
October 1, 2014, EY had filed in New York State court to have the arbitration award 
confirmed for final effect.  
In addition, EY has faced various suits from Lehman investors and, in November 2013, 
announced that it would pay $99 million to settle one such case, pending court approval. (See 
In Re Lehman Brothers Equity/Debt Securities Litigation.) Still pending in the New York Civil 
Supreme Court as of October 2014 was a lawsuit brought by the Attorney General of New 
York seeking to have EY disgorge $150 million in fees it received from Lehman in the alleged 
fraud of reviewing Lehman’s faulty financial statements. (See People of the State of New York 
v. Ernst & Young LLP.) 
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Appendix A: AU 508: Reports on Audited Financial Statements Excerpts 
and Commentary 
 
508.08(j). The form of the auditor's standard report on financial statements covering a 
single year is as follows: 
Independent Auditor's Report 
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of X Company as of December 31, 
20XX, and the related statements of income, retained earnings, and cash flows for the 
year then ended. These financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's 
management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial 
statements based on our audit. 
We conducted our audit in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in 
the United States of America. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 
audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free 
of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence 
supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also 
includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by 
management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We 
believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. 
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all material 
respects, the financial position of X Company as of [at] December 31, 20XX, and the 
results of its operations and its cash flows for the year then ended in conformity with 
accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America. 
[Signature] 
[Date] 
[. . . .] 
 
508.08(k). When performing an integrated audit of financial statements and internal 
control over financial reporting, if the auditor issues separate reports on the company's 
financial statements and on internal control over financial reporting, the following 
paragraph should be added to the auditor's report on the company's financial statements: 
 
We also have audited, in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (United States), the effectiveness of X Company's internal control over 
financial reporting as of December 31, 20XX, based on [identify control criteria] and our 
report dated [date of report, which should be the same as the date of the report on the 
financial statements] expressed [include nature of opinions]. 
 
508.10. This section also discusses the circumstances that may require the auditor to depart 
from the standard report and provides reporting guidance in such circumstances. This 
section is organized by type of opinion that the auditor may express in each of the various 
circumstances presented; this section describes what is meant by the various audit opinions: 
 
1. Unqualified opinion. An unqualified opinion states that the financial statements 
present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position, results of operations, 
and cash flows of the entity in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles. This is the opinion expressed in the standard report discussed in 
paragraph .08. 
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2. Explanatory language added to the auditor's standard report. Certain circumstances, 
while not affecting the auditor's unqualified opinion on the financial statements, 
may require that the auditor add an explanatory paragraph (or other explanatory 
language) to his or her report. 
 
3. Qualified opinion. A qualified opinion states that, except for the effects of the 
matter(s) to which the qualification relates, the financial statements present fairly, 
in all material respects, the financial position, results of operations, and cash flows 
of the entity in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. 
 
4. Adverse opinion. An adverse opinion states that the financial statements do not 
present fairly the financial position, results of operations, or cash flows of the entity 
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. 
 
5. Disclaimer of opinion. A disclaimer of opinion states that the auditor does not 
express an opinion on the financial statements. 
 





The current form of auditor report is delivered in a pass/fail rubric without detail or 
commentary. However, as provided in Section 508.10, EY did have other options available to 
it other than providing an unqualified opinion. It could have added an explanatory note or 
issued a qualified, but not adverse, opinion.  
 
A recent proposal by the PCABO would retain the pass/fail rubric but require additional 
information and commentary to increase the communicative value of the report and better 
inform investors.  
 
“Most significantly, the proposed auditor reporting standard would require the 
auditor to communicate in the auditor's report ‘critical audit matters’ that would be 
specific to each audit. The auditor's required communication would focus on those 
matters the auditor addressed during the audit of the financial statements that 
involved the most difficult, subjective, or complex auditor judgments or posed the 
most difficulty to the auditor in obtaining sufficient appropriate audit evidence or 
forming an opinion on the financial statements” (PCAOB Release 2013-005).  
 
For further discussion of developments see also:  
 
• Deloitte Comment Letter regarding PCAOB Release 2013-005. 
• Goelzer, Daniel L., PCAOB Board Member, Statement on the proposed new standard 
for audit reports.  
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May 18, 2008 
 




Mr. Martin Kelly, Controller 
Mr. Gerard Reilly, Head of Capital Markets Product Control 
Ms. Erin Callan, Chief Financial Officer 
Mr. Christopher O’Meara, Chief Risk Officer 
Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. and subsidiaries 
745 7th Avenue 
New York, N.Y. 10019 
 
Gentlemen and Madam: 
 
I have been employed by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. and subsidiaries (the “Firm”) since 
May 1994, currently in the position of Senior Vice President in charge of the Firm’s 
consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheets of over one thousand legal entities 
worldwide. During my tenure with the Firm I have been a loyal and dedicated employee and 
always have acted in the Firm’s best interests. 
 
I have become aware of certain conduct and practices, however, that I feel compelled to bring 
to your attention, as required by the Firm’s Code of Ethics, as Amended February 17, 2004 
(the “Code”) and which requires me, as a Firm employee, to bring to the attention of 
management conduct and actions on the part of the Firm that I consider to possibly 
constitute unethical or unlawful conduct. I therefore bring the following to your attention, as 
required by the Code, “to help maintain a culture of honesty and accountability”. (Code, first 
paragraph). 
 
The second to last section of the Code is captioned “FULL, FAIR, ACCURATE, TIMELY AND 
UNDERSTANDABLE DISCLOSURE”. That section provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
 
“It is crucial that all books of account, financial statements and records of the Firm reflect the 
underlying transactions and any disposition of assets in a full, fair, accurate and timely 
manner. All employees…must endeavor to ensure that information in documents that 
Lehman Brothers files with or submits to the SEC, or otherwise disclosed to the public, is 
presented in a full, fair, accurate, timely and understandable manner. Additionally, each 
individual involved in the preparation of the Firm’s financial statements must prepare those 
statements in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, consistently 
applied, and any other applicable accounting standards and rules so that the financial 
statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position, results of operations 
and cash flows of the Firm. 
 
Furthermore, it is critically important that financial statements and related disclosures be 
free of material errors. Employees and directors are prohibited from knowingly making or 
causing others to make a materially misleading, incomplete or false statement to an 
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accountant or an attorney in connection with an audit or any filing with any governmental 
or regulatory entity. In that connection, no individual, or any person acting under his or her 
direction, shall directly or indirectly take any action to coerce, manipulate, mislead or 
fraudulently influence any of the Firm’s internal auditors or independent auditors if he or 
she knows (or should know) that his or her actions, if successful, could result in rendering 
the Firm’s financial statements materially misleading” 
 
In the course of performing my duties for the Firm, I have reason to believe that certain 
conduct on the part of senior management of the Firm may be in violation of the Code. The 
following is a summary of the conduct I believe may violate the Code and which I feel 
compelled, by the terms of the Code, to bring to your attention. 
 
1. Senior Firm management manages its balance sheet assets on a daily basis. On the last day 
of each month, the books and records of the Firm contain approximately five (5) billion 
dollars of net assets in excess of what is managed on the last day of the month. I believe this 
pattern indicates that the Firm’s senior management is not in sufficient control of its assets 
to be able to establish that its financial statements are presented to the public and 
governmental agencies in a “full, fair accurate and timely manner”. In my opinion, 
respectfully submitted, I believe the result is that at the end of each month, there could be 
approximately five (5) billion dollars of assets subject to a potential write-off. I believe it will 
take a significant investment of personnel and better control systems to adequately identify 
and quantify these discrepancies but, at the minimum, I believe the manner in which the 
Firm is reporting these assets is potentially misleading to the public and various 
governmental agencies. If so, I believe the Firm may be in violation of the Code. 
 
2. The Firm has an established practice of substantiating each balance sheet account for each 
of its worldwide legal entities on a quarterly basis. While substantiation is somewhat 
subjective, it appears to me that the Code as well as Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles require the Firm to support the net dollar amount in an account balance in a 
meaningful way supporting the Firm’s stated policy of “full, fair, accurate and timely manner” 
valuation. The Firm has tens of billions of dollars of unsubstantiated balances, which may or 
may not be “bad” or non-performing assets or real liabilities. In any event, the Firm’s senior 
management may not be in a position to know whether all of these accounts are, in fact, 
described in a “full, fair, accurate and timely” manner, as required by the Code. I believe the 
Firm needs to make an additional investment in personnel and systems to adequately 
address this fundamental flaw. 
 
3. The Firm has tens of billions of dollar of inventory that it probably cannot buy or sell in 
any recognized market, at the currently recorded current market values, particularly when 
dealing in assets of this nature in the volume and size as the positions the Firm holds. I do 
not believe the manner in which the Firm values that inventory is fully realistic or 
reasonable, and ignores the concentration in these assets and their volume size given the 
current state of the market’s overall liquidity. 
 
4. I do not believe the Firm has invested sufficiently in the required and reasonably necessary 
financial systems and personnel to cope with this increased balance sheet, specifically in 
light of the increased number of accounts, dollar equivalent balances and global entities, 
which have been created by or absorbed within the Firm as a result of the Firm’s rapid 
growth since the Firm became a publicly traded company in 1994. 
 
5. Based upon my experience and the years I have worked for the Firm, I do not believe there 
is sufficient knowledgeable management in place in the Mumbai, India Finance functions and 
department. There is a very real possibility of a potential misstatement of material facts 
being efficiently distributed by that office. 
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6. Finally, based upon my personal observations over the past years, certain senior level 
internal audit personnel do not have the professional expertise to properly exercise the audit 
functions they are entrusted to manage, all of which have become increasingly complex as 
the Firm has undergone rapid growth in the international marketplace. 
 
I provide these observations to you with the knowledge that all of us at the Firm are 
entrusted to observe and respect the Code. I would be happy to discuss any details regarding 
the foregoing with senior management but I felt compelled, both morally and legally, to bring 
these issues to your attention. These are, indeed, turbulent times in the economic world and 
demand, more than ever, our adherence and respect of the Code so that the Firm may 
continue to enjoy the investing public’s trust and confidence in us. 
 




cc: Erwin J. Shustak, Esq. 
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